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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 January 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Bloc Comment on State of the Union Message: Moscow and Peiping have given divergent propaganda treatment to President Eisenhower's State of the Union message. Moscow has not yet commented editorially, but its extensive summaries of the speech and initial radio comment have been generally moderate and commendatory, emphasizing the President's statements of readiness to hold serious talks with the Soviet Union and minimizing critical remarks.

Peiping, on the other hand, has accused the President of "paying lip service to peace" while "brandishing missiles and nuclear arms." The Chinese charge that the speech indicates the US "has not even the minimum respect for truth," state that Eisenhower "did not give the slightest hint as to concrete steps," and discount the possibility of any serious East-West negotiations.

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USSR: The Soviet Communist party has called for a major reshaping of domestic propaganda activities in an effort to prevent a lowering of the population's ideological guard during the "peaceful coexistence" campaign and to mobilize maximum popular support for the Kremlin's economic program. In a lengthy and wide-ranging resolution issued by the party central committee on 10 January, the party demands a closer alignment between the output of the vast propaganda machinery and the immediate political and economic objectives of the regime. The resolution, which calls attention to the increased role of persuasion under Khrushchev's rule, may be timed to coincide with abolition of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which reportedly is to take place at the Supreme Soviet session scheduled to open on 14 January.

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Lebanese crisis. In a move evidently designed to offset Elliott's complete lack of diplomatic experience, and perhaps also his pro-Communist bias, a Ghana diplomat who has been serving at the UN and who appears to be pro-Western in orientation is being sent to Moscow as Elliott's assistant. (Page 4)

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12 Jan 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

India to Meet Increased Defense Needs by Stepping Up Investment in Heavy Industry

The impact of the India-China border dispute on New Delhi's long-range economic planning is becoming increasingly evident. Lengthy cabinet discussions apparently have resulted in a decision to place additional emphasis on heavy industry, particularly steel production, during the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) as the best means of meeting increased defense requirements.

The goal for annual crude steel production apparently has been fixed at 10,000,000 metric tons, indicating that proponents of a less ambitious target have been overruled. The Second Five-Year Plan calls for 6,000,000 tons a year by 1961. Completion of India's three new foreign-assisted steel plants will give it this capacity, although actual production probably will not reach 6,000,000 tons by the end of the second plan. High priority will be given to construction of a fourth government-owned steel plant in order to help fulfill the third-plan target.

Substantially increased outlays for defense production facilities, probably to include manufacture of military transport and construction equipment, are planned. In addition, considerable funds will be set aside to expand development of strategic roads in border areas. For example, officials of the North-East Frontier Agency in Assam recently announced that about a million dollars will be spent during the coming fiscal year to step up the construction of roads and airstrips in this region in view of the Sino-Indian border incidents.

	There will be som	e increase in the defens	se budget it-
self.	Funds reportedly	y have been allocated to	buy arms

abroad, but Nehru argues that India must manufacture its own weapons. He has stressed in numerous public and parliamentary speeches that India's defense position can be improved only by strengthening the country's economic base. He apparently hopes to exploit public and official indignation over recent Chinese actions to stimulate greater efforts	
toward economic development.	25X1
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12 Jan 60

Ghana Designates Ambassador to USSR

Ghana's first ambassador to the USSR, John B. Elliott, has been associated with the most militant leftists in Prime Minister Nkrumah's regime. His appointment, announced in Moscow on 8 January, could facilitate the bloc's present efforts to extend its influence in Africa through the cultivation of sympathetic individuals within local nationalist parties and movements. The USSR's first ambassador to Accra presented his credentials last August.

Elliott, who visited Moscow en route to and from the September 1958 Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Tashkent, has long been a militant activist within Nkrumah's Convention People's party (CPP). Two years ago he was a member of a select, socialist-minded "study group" within the National Association of Socialist Students' Organization (NASSO)a grouping officially described as the "ideological wing of the CPP"	25X1 25X1
During the 1958 Lebanese crisis Elliott and other anti-Western NASSO members are reported to have urged Nkrumah to condemn the action taken by the US.	25X1
On the official level, Elliott has held positions with the government's cocoa-marketing institutions and most recently served as deputy head of the Industrial Development Corporation, another important government entity. Last spring he was listed as an assistant in the office of Nkrumah's African affairs adviser.	
Presumably to compensate for Elliott's lack of diplomatic experience—and perhaps also for his reported pro-Communist bias—a Ghanaian diplomat at the UN who appears to be pro-Western in orientation is being transferred to Moscow as first secretary.	
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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

